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ABSTRACT. On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Unlawful Internet
GamblingEnforcementAct (UIGEA)of2006asanattachment to theSecurity andAccountability for
Every Port Act of 2006. UIGEA is the first federal regulation specific to the online gaming industry.
In this article, we examine the impact of UIGEA and its subsequent interpretation (through
administrative rulemaking andDepartment of Justice actions) on the value of U.S. publicly traded
firms in the gaming industry. We find that UIGEA is associated with an average increase in firm
values in the gaming industry of approximately 2.86%. We also find that firms with a greater
percentage of revenue from retail gaming gainedmore fromUIGEA. Finally, we document that the
JusticeDepartment’s ruling onDecember 23, 2011, that not all gaming on the Internet is illegal, is
associatedwith apositive3.55%return.Weconclude that allowed, regulated, controlledgrowthof
Internet gaming is likely to provide significant value to the U.S. gaming industry.
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF
THE STUDY
The Unfair Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act (UIGEA) was signed into law by President
GeorgeW. Bush as a conference report added to
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
(SAEPA) of 2006 (GovTrack.us, n.d.). The UIGEA
was the first federal legislation aimed specifically
at the regulation of Internet gaming. Interpret-
ation of the law occurred through administrative
rulemaking and Department of Justice (DOJ)
actions over the next 6 years. Prior to the 2006
Act, many attempts to provide federal oversight
of Internet gaming occurred. Between 1995 and
thepassage ofUIGEA in2006, therewere 19bills
submitted to either the House or the Senate that
were intended to provide regulationof the online
gaming industry (Table 1). In addition to the
regulatory bills were two bills to study Internet
gaming and one bill to express consensus.
UIGEA prohibits the transfer of funds from a
financial institution to an Internet gambling site,
with exceptions for “fantasy” sports, online
lotteries, and horse/harness racing. Both prior
to and after the passage of the UIGEA, there
was considerable diversity of opinion among
lawmakers about the structure of optimal
Internet gambling regulation. For example,
various bills over time have been submitted
by both Democrats and Republicans. Thirteen
regulatory bills were submitted by Republicans,
and six regulatory bills were submitted by
Democrats prior to UIGEA. In addition, it was
11 years after the introduction of the first bill
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TABLE 1. Legislative Introduction of Bills and Department of Justice Actions With Respect to Online Gaming.***
# Intro H or S* D or R** Act Name Date of Introduction
1 H497 R National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act 01/11/1995
2 S704 D National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act 04/06/1995
3 H3526 D Computer Gambling Prevention Act of 1996 05/23/1996
4 S474 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 03/19/1997
5 H2380 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 09/03/1997
6 H4350 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998 07/29/1998
7 H4427 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998 08/06/1999
8 S692 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999 03/23/1999
9 H137 D Expressing the sense of Congress with regard to the recommendations
of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
06/18/1999
10 H3125 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 10/21/1999
11 H4419 R Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act 05/10/2000
12 H5020 D Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 07/27/2000
13 H556 R Leach-LaFalce Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 02/12/2000
14 H2579 D Internet Gambling Payments Prohibition Act 07/20/2000
15 H3215 R Combating Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act 11/01/2001
16 S3006 D Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2002 09/25/2002
17 H5760 D Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Commission Act 11/19/2002
18 H2143 R Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act 01/07/2003
19 H1223 D Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Commission Act 03/12/2003
20 S627 R Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act 03/13/2003
21 H2143 R Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act 05/19/2003
22 H4411 R Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act* 11/18/2005
23 H4777 R Internet Gambling Prohibition Act 02/16/2006
24 H4954 R SAFE Port Act: Portion of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act attached
to this Act just before passage by House and Senate***
03/14/2006
Safe Port Act introduced House 03/14/2006
Safe Port Act pass House 05/4/2006
Safe Port Act pass Senate 09/14/2006
UIGEA added to Safe Port Act as report accepted by House 09/29/2006
UIGEA added to Safe Port Act as report accepted by Senate 09/30/2006
Safe Port Act UIGEA signed by President Bush 10/13/2006
25 H5474 R Internet Gambling Study Commission Act 05/24/2006
26 H907 R Providing for consideration of the Bill (H.R. 4411) to prevent the use of
certain payment instruments, credit cards, and fund transfers for
unlawful Internet gambling, and for other purposes
07/10/2006
27 H2046 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of 2007 04/26/2007
28 H2140 D Internet Gambling Study Act 05/03/2007
29 H2610 D Skill Game Protection Act 06/07/2007
30 H5523 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2008 03/04/2008
31 H6663 R Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Clarification and
Implementation Act of 2008
07/30/2008
32 S3616 D Internet Skill Game Licensing and Control Act of 2008 09/26/2008
33 Federal Reserve Board in consultation with Attorney General announces
administrative rules associated with UIGEA
12/11/2008
34 H2267 D Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act 05/06/2009
35 H2268 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009 05/06/2009
36 S1597 D Internet Poker and Game of Skill Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act of 2009
08/06/2009
37 H4976 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2010 03/25/2010
38 H5599 D Wire Clarification Act of 2010 06/24/2010
39 H1174 R Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act 03/17/2011
40 Justice Department indictes four firms; “Black Friday” 04/15/2011
41 H2230 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2011 06/16/2011
42 H2366 R Internet Gambling Prohibition, Poker Consumer Protection, and
Strengthening UIGEA Act of 2011
06/24/2011
43 Justice Department Flip-Flops on the interpretation of The Wire Act 12/23/2011
(continued)
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before Congress reached consensus and
enacted legislation specific to the online
gambling industry.
As indicated in Table 2, support for UIGEA
has come from a long list of disparate groups,
including religious, banking, and other organ-
izations (Stop Predatory Gambling Organiz-
ation, 2006). It is noteworthy that the American
Gaming Association is not on the list of
supporting organizations. The American Gam-
ing Association, which began in 1995, purports
to lobby for the interests of the gaming industry.
Strangely, UIGEA is not mentioned in the
American Gaming Association’s 2006 annual
report (American Gaming Association, 2006).
The lack of attention to UIGEA in 2006 by the
American Gaming Association may be reflec-
tive of a lack of industry consensus in 2006 with
regard to the type of regulation the industry
desired. However, the lack of consensus does
not necessarily imply that the industry leaders
were unconcerned.
UIGEA has received a considerable amount
of attention from the public, and debate has
been heated. Some proponents believed it
would protect vulnerable individuals (Cypra,
2009; Hills, 2010; Kredell, 2010). Typical of
many religious organizations that supported
UIGEA, Focus on the Family’s gambling spokes-
person, Chad Hills, stated that “From our
perspective, Internet gambling represents one
of the most invasive and highly addictive forms
of gambling.” By implication, religious organiz-
ations who supportedUIGEA believe it provides
a disincentive to Internet gamble and that this is
good for at-risk individuals.
On the other side of the debate are those
who think that individuals should have a right to
choose the activities they engage in and should
not be constrained by legislative actions
(Kredell 2010). This view was exemplified by
Senator Barney Frank. Senator Frank argued
There is a practice around today that causes a
lot of problems, damages families, people
lose their jobs, they get in debt. They do it in
excess. It is called drinking. . . . Prohibition
didn’t work for alcohol; it doesn’t work for
gambling.
Disagreement about Internet gaming and
UIGEA continues to the current day. Illustrating
this debate, Sheldon Adelson, CEO of Las Vegas
Sands Casino, strongly opposed the legalization
of online gaming, yet Caesars Entertainment,
MGM, and the American Gaming Association
expressed strong views in favor of legalizing
Internet gaming (Kusnetz, 2014; Stewart 2011).
The importance of regulation to the gaming
industry is revealed by the fact that the gaming
industry, between 2009 and 2012, contributed
TABLE 1 – (Continued)
# Intro H or S* D or R** Act Name Date of Introduction
44 H2282 R Internet Gambling Regulation, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection
Act of 2013
06/06/2013
45 H2666 R Internet Poker Freedom Act of 2013 07/11/2013
46 H3491 D Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2013 11/14/2013
* If the Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives it is denoted by H. If the Bill was introduced into the Senate it is denoted
by S. Next to H or S is the House or Senate Bill number, respectively.
** Over the years, 23 Internet gambling Bills were originated by Democrats (signified by D), and 21 were originated by Republicans
(signified by R).
*** UIGEA added as a conference report 109-711 to the Port Act after discussions in the Senate H.R. Bill 4411. The language of the
Bill was drawn almost exclusively from H.R. Bill 4411. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) is a U.S. law
which was approved in late 2006. It was added to the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 via conference committee and
was signed by President Bush on October 13, 2006. The Act prohibits the transfer of funds from a financial institution to an Internet
gambling site, with the notable exceptions of “fantasy” sports, online lotteries, and horse/harness racing. The UIGEA became law despite
never being debated on by the Senate. It passed the House on July 11, 2006 by a 317–93 vote (22 nonvotes) but was not taken up by the
Senate. During a conference committee to iron out the differences between the House and Senate’s version of the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 the UIGEA was added to that Bill, which was then approved in up-or-down votes by both
chambers of Congress. The House version of the UIGEA was cosponsored by Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and Jim Leach (R-Iowa).
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 27
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:1
9 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
a combined 287.6 million dollars to state and
federal political campaigns (Open Secrets,
2014). Presumably, these contributions were
intended to influence the outcome of legis-
lation. Still others claim that UIGEA has not
stopped the growth in online gaming and that
the winners of UIGEA are non-U.S. firms that
can evade UIGEA (Weinberg & Pruit, 2006).
We are unaware of any studies that have
estimated the net costs and benefits of UIGEA.
One previous study investigated the relationship
between online gaming and retail brick-and-
mortar gaming firms prior to UIGEA (Philander,
2011). This study found that for every dollar spent
on online gaming in America, 27–30 cents was a
cannibalization of revenues from the retail brick-
and-mortar gaming firms. Thus, brick-and-mortar
TABLE 2. Organizations That Supported Passage of UIGEA in
2006.
Type of
Organization # Organization Name
Sports 1 National Football League
2 National Collegiate Athletic Association
3 Major League Baseball
4 National Basketball Association
5 National Hockey League
Law
Enforcement
1 National Association of Attorneys General
2 National District Attorneys Association
3 Federal Criminal Investigators
4 Fraternal Order of Police
Financial
1 American Bankers Association
2 America’s Community Bankers
3 Securities Industry of America
4 American Express
5 Citigroup
6 MasterCard
7 HSBC North America
Family and Social
Welfare
1 National Coalition Against Gambling
Expansion
2 Truth About Gambling Foundation
3 Family Research Council
4 Christian Coalition
5 Concerned Women for America
6 American Values
7 Center for Moral Clarity
8 Citizens for Community Values
9 Eagle Forum
10 Family Leader Network
11 Family Resource Network
12 Focus on the Family
13 Religious Freedom Coalition
14 American Association of Christian Schools
15 Network of Politically Active Christians
16 The Center for Arizona Policy
17 Arkansas Family Council
18 Hawaii Family Forum
19 United Families Idaho
20 Illinois Family Institute
21 American Family Association of Indiana
22 Iowa Family Policy Center
23 The Family Foundation (Kentucky)
24 Louisiana Family Forum
25 Family Protection Lobby – Maryland
26 Massachusetts Family Institute
27 Minnesota Family Council
28 New Jersey Family Policy Council
29 North Carolina Family Policy Council
30 Stronger Families for Oregon
31 American Family Association of
Pennsylvania
32 TheFamilyResearch InstituteofWisconsin
(continued)
TABLE 2 – (Continued)
Type of
Organization # Organization Name
Religious
Organizations
1 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
2 General Board of Church and Society of
United Methodist Church
3 Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious
Liberty Commission
4 American Council of Churches*
Total All
Organizations
52
*Members of American Council of Churches: African
Methodist Episcopal Church, Malankara Orthodox Syrian
Church, The African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Mar
Thoma Church, Moravian Church in America Northern Province
and Southern Province, Alliance of Baptists, American Baptist
Churches in the USA, National Baptist Convention of America,
The Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North
America, National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Diocese of the
Armenian Church of America Inc., National Missionary Baptist
Convention, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) of America,
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Orthodox Church in
America, Church of the Brethren, Patriarchal Parishes of the
Russian Orthodox Church in the USA, The Coptic Orthodox
Church in North America, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the
Society of Friends, The Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, Polish National Catholic Church of America,
Friends United Meeting, Progressive National Baptist Convention
Inc., Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, Reformed Church
in America, Hungarian Reformed Church in America, Serbian
Orthodox Church in the U.S.A and Canada, International Council
of Community Churches, The Swedenborgian Church, Syrian
Orthodox Church of Antioch, Korean Presbyterian Church in
America, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, and United
Church of Christ.
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gaming and online gaming are partial substitutes.
Regulation thatdiminishes (expands) competitive
online gamingwill increase (reduce) the revenues
of brick-and mortar-firms.
In our study, we provide several insights with
regard to the impact of online gaming regulation
on public retail brick-and-mortar firms in the
United States and their U.S. suppliers. We refer
to these firms as brick-mortar and supplier firms
(BMS firms). We investigate the impact of
UIGEA, as well as the later interpretation of
UIGEA by administrative rulemaking and
actions by the DOJ. We do not attempt to
measure the impact of these actions on the
online gaming firms.
To conduct our event study, we examine
the Congressional Record, the Wall Street
Journal, Forbes, The Federal Register, The New
York Times, and online press releases to identify
informational events that might provide
investors with value-relevant information
about the content of and likelihood of UIGEA
being passed into law. Additionally, we examine
these publications, and others, to identify
administrative rulemaking and DOJ actions
that are likely to lead to a more precise
interpretation of the impact of the Act on BMS
firms. We use the capital asset pricing model to
determine normal returns for firms over the
informational event periods. We define abnor-
mal returns (ARs) as the actual returns minus the
normal returns predicted by the model. The
ARs measure the overall change in the market
value of gaming firms as a result of the UIGEA,
as well as related rulemaking and DOJ actions.
We conduct cross-sectional analyses of the ARs
to determine how the wealth effects of UIGEA
vary depending on the nature of the firm.
Ourmarket-based approachprovides inves-
tors’ assessments of expected future regulatory
costs and benefits as reflected in current stock
prices. It also gives evidence on the types of firms
that investors expect to benefit the most from
regulation. Such delineationmay helpmanagers
better understand the benefit or cost of
regulation to their firms.
The remainder of the section proceeds as
follows. Following, we describe the perspective
of the American Gaming Association on the
desirability of regulating Internet gaming in the
United States1 and provide an interpretation of
changes in the regulatory climate over time.
This discussion provides a backdrop to the
subsequent discussion of individual informa-
tional events. Then, we describe the UIGEA
and administrative law associated with it.
To conclude the section, we describe the DOJ
actions that provided information to the market
about the form that enforcement of the UIGEA
would take.
Desirability of Internet Gaming
Regulation and Overview of
Regulation Timeline
The American Gaming Association has
stated that the best outcome for consumers
and gaming companies would be a regulated
Internet gaming market where a limited
number of firms, certified by the government
to operate, would follow specific guidelines and
rules (American Gaming Association, 2006).
These guidelines and rules would safeguard
against underage and addictive gaming. These
rules would also protect gamblers from
unscrupulous companies that do not provide
the product that they advertise. The industry
has never supported the total elimination of
Internet gaming. The American Gaming Associ-
ation adopted this position because it believes
this regulation will lead to growth in revenues
for U.S. gaming firms, as well as increased
employment. Hence, the industry supports
regulation that is conducive to the growth of its
existing membership (Stewart, 2006, 2010).
Regulation of Internet gaming and the
impact of regulation on BMS firms has evolved
over time. The Wire Act of 1961 was originally
1As of 2014, the U.S. gambling firms and their equipment
suppliers that are members of the American Gaming Association
include:Aristocrat Technologies, Inc., Bally Technologies, Inc., Boyd
Gambling Corporation, Caesars Entertainment Group, Churchill
Downs, Inc., Gambling Partners International, Gaughan South LLC/
dba/South Point Hotel & Casino, GTECH, International Game
Technology (IGT), Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., JCM American
Corporation, Konami Gambling, Inc., Las Vegas Sands Corp., MGM
Resorts International, Multimedia Games, Inc., Penn National
Gambling, Inc., Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc., Resorts World New
York,RockOhioVentures LLC,StationCasinos, andWMSGambling
Inc.
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intended to regulate the wire transfer of funds
for illegal gaming and for many years was the
only federal legislation that applied to Internet
gaming. Prior to UIGEA, however, retail gaming
executives were unclear about the applicability
of the Wire Act to Internet gaming. Uncertain
whether Internet gaming was clearly legal or
clearly illegal, the brick-and-mortar gaming
firms took a conservative position and did not
enter the Internet gaming market prior to
UIGEA (Stewart, 2010). Not surprisingly, these
firms faced competition from the growing
presence of firms solely devoted to providing
Internet gaming, who were willing to bear the
risk that at a future date their business model
might be deemed unlawful. Hence, at the time
UIGEA was introduced into Congress, brick-
and-mortar firms would potentially gain from
the elimination of Internet gambling and,
therefore, the elimination of competition from
Internet gaming firms (Philander, 2011).
From 1995 to 2006, there were many failed
attempts to create federal legislation that would
regulate the Internet gaming market. Then,
in 2006, the UIGEA was passed into law. The
brick-and-mortar firms presumably supported
UIGEA because it held the promise of reducing
competition from the online gaming industry.
The following section describes the UIGEA in
greater detail.
Description of the UIGEA and Its
Interpretation Through
Administrative Rules
TheUIGEAwas signed into law by President
Bush on October 13, 2006, just two weeks after
it was attached as a conference report and
passed in the House on September 29, 2006,
and passed by the Senate the following day. The
UIGEAwas the first federal legislation enacted to
regulate Internet gaming by ensuring that the
Internet would not be used as a mechanism to
evade federal and state gaming laws. Following
is a five-part summary of the major points of the
legislation (Yeh & Doyle 2012):
1. Prohibits Internet gambling operators from
accepting money related to any online
gambling that violates state or federal law.
2. Requires the Department of Treasury and
the Federal Reserve Board to issue regu-
lations within nine months after enactment,
which will oblige financial systems to block
payments for unlawful Internet gambling.
3. Does not make any gambling activity illegal
thatwaspreviously legal, anddoesnotmake
any gambling activity legal that was
previously illegal.
4. Preserves and facilitates the right of
every state to determine and enforce the
gambling policies that will apply within state
borders.
5. Requires that, within 270 days, the Federal
Reserve Board, in conjunction with Depart-
ment of Treasury, will issue clarifying rules.
Input from the public and industry was to
be allowed during open meetings by the
Federal Reserve and the Department of the
Treasury. (Final rulemaking did not occur
until 12/11/2008.)
Schmitt (2008) argues that the UIGEA actually
does nothing to address the legality of online
gambling or describe what constitutes “unlaw-
ful Internet gambling.” Instead, the Act is aimed
at cutting off the flow of money to online
gambling by making it illegal to accept
payments or money transfers from persons
involved in any form of prohibited Internet
gambling. In other words, the intent of the Act
is to block offshore payment processors and
casinos from having access to U.S. banks and
credit card companies, thus making it imposs-
ible for Americans to put money into online
gambling accounts. Claburn (2011) emphasizes
that UIGEA makes it a crime for gambling
businesses to knowingly accept most forms of
payment for illegal gambling. Illegal gambling is
defined as any gambling that violates federal of
state law.
Discussion of Department of
Justice Actions
Uncertainty about the reach of the UIGEA
was not resolved until administrative rules were
issued approximately two years after UIGEA
was passed by Congress. From the period 2006
to 2010, the DOJ seemed unsure about its
30 M. S. JOHNSON ET AL.
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enforcement strategy. The first DOJ action was
referred to by the press as Black Friday (Claburn
2011; Holloway 2014; Richtel 2011; Bloom-
berg 2011). On Friday, April 15, 2011, the DOJ
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
conducted unannounced raids and initiated
action against three major online poker firms—
PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker,and Absolute Poker/
Ultimate Bet—as well as eight associated
financial institutions. These firms were indicted
on charges of illegal gaming and money
laundering. The individuals who assisted these
firms were arrested. UIGEA makes it a federal
crime for gaming businesses to “knowingly
accept” payment “in connection with the
participating of another person in unlawful
Internet gaming.” The three Internet compa-
nies in question had continued to offer online
poker services in the United States, subsequent
to passage of the UIGEA. To get around the
prohibition on U.S. banks from opening U.S.
bank accounts that received proceeds fromU.S.
gamblers, the gaming companies in question
carried out fraudulent transactions designed to
trick the banks (Bana, 2011; Clayburn, 2011;
and Holloway, 2014.) Thus, Black Friday
significantly reduced competition from inter-
national Internet gaming firms.
The second action by the Department of
Justice was dubbed the DOJ Flip-Flop by the
press and occurred on December 23, 2011.
The DOJ Flip-Flop was a ruling that not all
Internet gaming is illegal. Thus, the DOJ Flip-
Flow appeared to reverse the DOJ’s earlier
decision and signaled that Internet gaming was
legal if allowed by state law, as long as betting
did not cross state lines (Vardi, 2011; Wyatt,
2011). Although it was widely acknowledged
that this ruling did not open the floodgates to
Internet gaming, it did open the possibility that
future DOJ rulings might clarify further the types
of Internet gaming that are legal. This ruling
would likely benefit BMS firms in two ways.
One, BMS firms were now poised to compete
in the Internet gaming market (Philander,
2011). Two, immediately after the passage of
UIGEA, Internet gaming shifted from U.S. based
Internet firms to foreign-based firms (Weinberg
& Pruit 2006). That is, UIGEA eliminated
domestic competition, but increased foreign
competition. Hence, lawful Internet gaming
would allow BMS firms to compete with
overseas Internet gaming firms. The American
Gaming Association stated that they were now
in favor of regulated Internet gaming (Philander,
2011).
Our article proceeds as follows. The
following section reviews the event study
literature and summarizes the individual
regulatory events associated with the UIGEA
and the DOJ actions. We also discuss the likely
impact of each of the UIGEA and the DOJ
actions on gaming firms. “Event Study Research
Design” explains our research design, including
a description of the sample firms, the event
study methodology, and the types of gaming
firms expected to receive the greatest benefit
from these regulatory actions. Results of our
event study follow. “Conclusion” summarizes
the findings and contributions of the research.
Previous Event Studies
The usefulness of event study methodology
is well established in the hospitality literature.
Previous event studies have examined a variety
of topics, including the wealth effects of gaming
company mergers (Bloom, 2010), IT news in
the hospitality industry (Kim et al., 2009; Lee &
Connolly, 2010), and the impact of terrorism on
hospitality stocks (Chang & Zeng, 2011).2 There
are also two studies that have used event study
methodology to examine the impact of
regulation on hospitality firms. One study
examines the impact of smoking bans on
hospitality firms (Tomlin, 2009), and the other
examines the impact of the Travel Promotion
Act on firm value in the hotel sector (Johnson
2Additional event studies in the hospitality literature include
initial public offerings in the hospitality industry (Canina 1996,
Canina and Gibson 2003), acquisitions in the lodging industry
(Canina 2001; Chatfield et al., 2012; Ma et al. 2011, Oak &
Andrew 2006, Oak & Dalbor 2009), the impact of options listing
(Atkinson et al., 1998; Kwansa, 1994), dividend increases (Borde
et al., 1999), the SARS outbreak (Chen et al., 2007), new
gambling openings (Nicolau, 2002), cash dividend announce-
ments (Sheel and Zhong 2005), going private transactions
(Wallace, 2004), the impact of delisting stocks (Leung et al.,
2013), and the impact of weekly RevPAR announcements (Bloom
& Zheng, 2013).
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 31
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:1
9 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
et al., 2015). There are also numerous
examples of event studies outside the hospital-
ity literature that have examined the effects of
regulation on other industries.3
We develop four hypotheses about the
economic impact of the UIGEA, subsequent
rulings, and DOJ actions on gaming firms.
To test the hypotheses, we measure changes in
the value of the firms’ equity in response to the
regulatory events. In cross-sectional analyses,
we also use the percentage of each firms’
revenue that comes from retail gaming to
explain the size of a given firm’s stock return.
Individual Events and the Effect of
Regulatory Change
The previous discussion indicates that there
is a great deal of confusion about the effect
of major regulatory actions on the gaming
industry. One reason the confusion arises is the
complexity of the UIGEA, administrative rules,
and DOJ actions. A second reason is that the
regulation and its implementation occurred
over a long period of time. A close examination
of the American Gaming Association’s White
paper, Statement of Preferred Policy, provides a
good summary of what the national association
believes has been the effect over time of online
gaming on BMS firms. Their view holds that in
the early days of Internet gaming (i.e., before
UIGEA), BMS firms were very reluctant to invest
in, or enter, the area of online gaming. Hence,
almost all of the online gaming was conducted
by non-U.S. firms (Stewart, 2011). Thus,
passage of the UIGEA was unlikely to have a
negative impact on BMS firms because the
firms were not heavily involved in activities that
the UIGEA restricted. However, passage of
UIGEA did constitute a multibillion dollar loss
for international companies involved in Internet
gaming (Bowers, 2006; Tiech, 2008). Philander
(2011) provides insight about the impact of the
UIGEA. Philander found that in the pre-UIGEA
period, every dollar spent on Internet gaming
led to approximately a $0.27 to $0.30
reduction in the revenues received by BMS
firms. From this, we predict that the UIGEA will
have a significant, positive, impact on BMS
firms because consumers that might not be able
to gamble on the Internet as easily choose to
partially substitute their activities by visiting
BMS firms.
On December 12, 2008, the Federal
Reserve, in conjunction with the Department
of Treasury, issued final rules with regard to the
interpretation of the UIGEA. The final rulemak-
ing received relatively little press coverage. This
lack of attention is likely due to two factors.
One, there were multiple public hearings about
the rules between the passage of the UIGEA
and the rulemaking. Thus, investors had many
observations that could lead to the forming of
expectations about the likely form of the rules.
Two, rulemaking was delayed several times,
and the final rules were issued two years late.
If the final rulemaking were to impact the BMS
firms, it was not clear what the direction the
effect would take. The rulemaking announce-
ment might be good news to the BMS firms if
UIGEA is more beneficial to BMS firms than
investors have anticipated. Otherwise, the
rulemaking announcement might be bad
news to the BMS firms if UIGEA is less
beneficial to BMS firms than investors have
anticipated. Thus, we offer a two-sided
prediction about the effects of rulemaking
announcements on firm value.
The current opinion of the American
Gaming Association is that the best thing for
the gaming industry would be a regulated
gaming market that protects consumers from
disreputable gaming firms and yet allows
existing U.S. gaming firms to expand into
Internet gaming. This, it is believed, would
protect underage and problem gamblers and
yet allow for employment and revenue growth
for legitimate businesses that provide a
service that the adult public desires. Because
of the changing industry environment since
the initiation of UIGEA, it is unclear whether
3Studies of the impact of regulations on shareholder wealth
include analysis of a variety of topics: U.K.electricity industry
regulation (Dnes et al., 1998), OSHA-imposed dust standards on
textile firms (Hughes et al., 1986), the impact of product recalls
(Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985), merger regulations (Schipper &
Thompson, 1983), environmental regulation and disclosure
(Blacconiere & Patten, 1994), and the effect of the Bank Holding
Company Act (Aharony & Swary 1981), to name a few.
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DOJ actions will have a positive or negative
effect on BMS firms. The DOJ ruling on Black
Friday signaled a growing clamp-down on
Internet gaming. If the BMS firms were in a
similar situation in 2011 as they were in 2006
this might be good news because of the
negative impact on non-U.S. firms that have
been cannibalizing their revenues. However, if
the BMS firms have changed in the fashion that
the American Gaming Association white paper
suggests, then the BMS firms might wish to see
online gaming clearly legalized so that they can
enter this market. In that case, they will be
negatively impacted by Black Friday (Stewart,
2011). Similar logic applies to the DOJ
Flip-Flop in which the DOJ states that some
Internet gaming is now legal. The impact of this
ruling could be positive or negative.
We examine the impact of UIGEA on the
gaming industry by examining the sign and
magnitude of changes in equity values in
response to events associated with the UIGEA.
Amajor difficulty associated with measuring
the impact of regulation on firm values is the
selection of the appropriate informational
events. Specifically, at what times, and in what
form, does the market receive information
useful to the forming of expectations about
future firm values? We obtain informational
events and dates from an examination of The
Wall Street Journal, The Congressional Record as
reported by GovTrack.us (2014), and The New
York Times. For the UIGEA and its administrative
rules, we examine two different windows of
information. We disregarded the large number
of potential informational events about legis-
lation. Specifically we did not examine the large
number of attempts at introduction of legislation
to regulate gaming of the Internet prior to the
UIGEA because we believe that each of the
many unsuccessful attempts at creating legis-
lation would have a negligible impact on beliefs
about the future risks and returns to investments
in the gaming industry.
The first informational event we consider is
the passage of the UIGEA by the House and
the Senate. On September 29, 2006, the
UIGEA was added as a conference report to
the SAEPA and passed in the House by a vote
of 409 to 2. The following day, on September
30, the UIGEA was added as a conference
report to the SAEPA (in the Senate and then
passed in the House) by a unanimous vote
(GovTrack.us, n.d.). Because these actions
occurred so close to each other, we view
them as one event. Because both votes in
Congress on the conference report had almost
unanimous bipartisan support, we conclude
that the actual signing of the bill by the
president did not provide additional infor-
mation to the market because it was unlikely
that the president would veto the bill.
Our second informational event is the
UIGEA rulemaking by the Federal Reserve and
the Department of the Treasury. This rulemak-
ing put flesh on the bones of the UIGEA. This
rulemaking occurred on December 11, 2008.
The final two events are related to actions
by the judicial branch. These events include: (a)
the indictment by DOJ of Internet gaming firms
for money laundering and unlawful Internet
gaming and (b) the DOJ Flip-Flop in which the
DOJ stated that not all Internet gaming is illegal.
We posit that the impact of Black Friday, the
indictment of online gaming firms, could have
either a positive or a negative effect on BMS
firms. This is because the action simultaneously
destroys online competitors that were canniba-
lizing BMS revenue and it reduces the like-
lihood that the BMS could find growth through
expansion into online gaming. We also posit
that the DOJ Flip-Flop will have a positive
impact upon the BMS firms because it indicates
that some online, regulated gaming would be
deemed legal.
Hypotheses
Consistent with our previous discussion, we
offer four hypotheses about Internet gaming
regulation. The first hypothesis is a test of the
most important question in this article. Here, we
examine whether the introduction of Internet
gaming regulation has a significant impact on the
BMS firms. If the results of this hypothesis are
insignificant,we conclude thatmanagers of BMS
should be unconcerned about regulation of
Internet gaming. In contrast, if UIGEA has a
positive impact on firm value, then managers of
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BMS firms should support regulation of Internet
gaming. Thus the first hypothesis (H1A) is:
H1A: Attachment of the UIGEA to the SAEPA
by Congress is associated with a positive
impact on Gaming firm stock perform-
ance. Sign is positive.
The second hypothesis tested in this study
examines whether administrative lawmaking
by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had a
significant impact on the BMS firms. This test
examines the effect on firms of postlegislative
administrative rules associated with the
implementation of the UIGEA. We ask whether
these administrative rules had a significant
modifying effect on theoriginalUIGEA legislation.
This is relevant tomanagers of BMS firms because
the impact of administrative law rulings is often
significant. Thus the second hypothesis (H1B) is:
H1B: Administrative law making by the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury is
associated with a significant impact on
Gaming Firms’ stock performance. Sign
is unknown.
The third and fourth hypotheses examine
whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) rulings
on the interpretation of the UIGEA are likely to
impact BMS firms. There were two major DOJ
rulings associated with the implementation of
the UIGEA. We refer to the first DOJ ruling as
Black Friday and the secondas the Flip-Flop. The
fact that administrative rule makers change their
minds, as evidenced by the Black Friday and
Flip-Flop rulings, highlights the cost that
regulatory uncertainty imposes on BMS man-
agers as they plan and implement corporate
strategies. These two rulings, alone, significantly
impacted both the nature of competition in the
industry and the markets that are open to BMS
firms. Thus the third and fourth hypotheses
become H1C and H1D.
H1C: The Department of Justice Black Friday
Ruling is associated with a significant
impact on gaming firm stock perform-
ance. Sign is unknown.
H1D: The Department of Justice Flip-Flop is
associated with a positive significant
impact on gaming firm performance
because some regulated online gaming
will be legal. Sign is positive.
Cross-Sectional Determinants of
Market Reaction
We also develop one cross-sectional hypoth-
esis with regard to the impact of regulation on
BMS firms. We expect that the impact of the
regulation will be greater for firms that have a
greater percentage of their revenues from retail,
non-online gaming. We make this prediction
because firms that have other sources of revenue
will be impacted less by the UIGEA. Additionally,
finding significance for this variablewouldprovide
support for the results of Philander (2011) who
found online gaming to be a partial substitute
for casino gaming. Knowledge of the differential
impact of the regulation on various subsectors of
the gaming industry helps managers to devise
more targeted, and hence, more effective and
efficient corporate strategies. For example, if
exposure is small, managers might wish to spend
very little effort devisingmarketing and investment
strategies that address competition from Internet
gaming. It might also help to explain why some
managers ofBMSfirms seemtobevery concerned
about online gaming regulation, whereas other
managers are seemingly unconcerned.
Thus, we predict that,
H2A: Ceteris paribus, firms with a higher
percentage of their revenues from retail
gaming will have a greater exposure to
regulation and thus experience a greater
impact from UIGEA.
Thus, we also predict that,
H2B: Ceteris paribus firms with a higher
percentage of their revenues from retail
gaming will have a greater exposure to
regulation and thus experience a greater
impact from the DOJ Flip Flop.
EVENT STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN
This section discusses the data and research
design used in the study.
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Sample Firms
Our initial sample consisted of U.S.-based,
publicly traded firms in the gaming industry,
including the known suppliers of gaming
hardware and software. We began with a list
of firms in Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) 7900
to 7999 and NAIC codes 713210 and 713290.
From this list, we retained firms whose stock
was traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
or the National Association of Security Dealers
Automated Quotation Service (NASDAQ).
We restricted our sample to public firms with
stock traded on U.S. equity markets in order to
be able to examine the impact of UIGEA on
firm value.
Examinations of the wealth effects of
regulation are complicated if there is the
leakage of information about the regulation in
advance of the regulatory events or if there are
confounding firm-specific events, such as
mergers, bankruptcy, earnings announcements,
and dividend announcements. Therefore, The
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times
were examined to detect either the early
release of information or confounding events.
This examination revealed that during the time
that the bill was considered, there was ongoing
discussion of the implications and possibility of
UIGEA. These discussions generally followed
the legislative actions and could be considered
an analysis of the proposals. However, we were
not able to discern specific events that would
have been likely to significantly alter investor
expectations about UIGEA other than the
actions listed in Table 3.
One of the gaming firms for which stock
price data was available, Trump Entertainment
Resorts, had confounding events during the
event testing periods. Trump Entertainment
went through bankruptcy-reorganization pro-
ceedings four times, in 1991, 1992, 2004, and
2009 (O’Connor, 2011). We removed this firm
from our sample because it was thought that
news associated with the multiple bankruptcies
overshadowed industry effects from the regu-
latory events associated with the UIGEA. This
left us with a sample size of 18 to 25 firms,
depending on the event examined. The
number of firms in the sample varied through
time due to merger and acquisition activity that
occurred over the 5-year period of this study.
No other merger and acquisition activity
occurred during the event period examined in
this study. Table 4 provides a list of the final
firms. The number of firms in the sample is
small relative to the sample size in most event
studies. A small sample size implies that the
power of our test statistics will be lower than
that of the typical event study. Thus, our small
sample sizes bias us against finding significant
results.
Test of Market Reaction
The first hypothesis is tested by examining
the overall industry market reaction to the four
TABLE 3. Selected Chronological Listing of SAEPA, UIGEA and Major Regulatory Occurrences.*
Name of Event
Informational
Event Tested
Number of Days
in Event Window Date Action
SAEPA 03/14/2006 Introduction in House
SAEPA 05/04/2006 Pass House
SAEPA 09/14/2006 Pass Senate
UIGEA added in conference
Report to SAEPA
Event 1 4 09/29/2006 Report Passes House 409 in favor, 2 opposed
Event 1 continued 09/30/2006 Report Passes Senate Unanimous
UIGEA Administrative Rules Event 2 3 11/12/2008 Final UIGEA Administrative Rules released
Black Friday Event 3 3 04/15/2011 Department of Justice indictment of 11 firms,
including 4 Internet gambling firms
Flip-Flop Event 4 3 12/23/2011 Department of Justice ruling that not all
Internet gambling is illegal
*Many previous legislative actions related to UIGEA are listed in Table 1.
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informational events. These potential informa-
tional events, as discussed earlier and summar-
ized in Table 3, are associated with the
introduction, passage, and signing into law of
Travel Promotion Act. For each of the four event
dates, the market reaction was determined by
measuring daily abnormal returns (i.e., the
differencebetweenactual andexpected returns).
To control for the effects of market-wide
fluctuations, the market model is used to
measure expected returns:
Rit ¼ ai þ biRmt þ eit;
where
Rit is the return for the ith Gaming firm on
day t,
ai is the intercept for the ith Gaming firm,
bi is the slope coefficient for the ith Gaming
firm
Rmt is the return on an equal-weighted
market portfolio on day t
eit is the error term with mean zero
Following the conventions of previous studies
(e.g., Hughes et al., 1986; Jarrell & Peltzman,
1985) and the findings of Brown and Warner
(1980, 1985); and Binder and Summer (1985),
an equal-weighted market index is used as
a proxy for the market rate of return. The
parameters ai and bi were estimated for the
event by using 255 trading days of daily return
data. Generally speaking, in event studies,
we want the parameters of the model to be
estimated over a short period before the event
occurs. This involves a trade-off. The closer the
estimation period is to the event period, the less
likely it is that sample firm betas have changed
due to changes in leverage, management
strategy, and firm investments, etc. However,
estimation data from a period too close to the
event period may be contaminated by
abnormal returns that were caused during
previous regulatory announcements or pro-
TABLE 4. Ticker Symbols and Names of the 26 Gaming Firms Available for Testing Events 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Firm # Name UIGEA Rulemaking for UIGEA DOJ Black Friday DOJ Flip- Flop
1 AMERISTAR CASINOS INC X X X X
2 AZTAR CORP X
3 BALLY TECHNOLOGIES INC X X X X
4 BOYD GAMBLING CORP X X X X
5 CANTERBURY PARK HOLDING CORP X X X X
6 CENTURY CASINOS INC X X X X
7 EMPIRE RESORTS INC X X X X
8 HARRAHS ENTERTAINMENT INC X
9 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY X X X X
10 ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS INC X X X X
11 LANDRYS RESTAURANTS INC X X
12 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP X X X X
13 M G M RESORTS INTERNATIONAL X X X X
14 M T R GAMING GROUP X X X X
15 MULTIMEDIA GAMES HOLDING CO INC X
16 PENN NATIONAL GAMBLING INC X X X X
17 PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP IN X X X X
18 PROGRESSIVE GAMBLING INTL CORP X X
19 RIVIERA HOLDINGS CORP X X
20 SANDS REGENT X
21 SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP X X X X
22 SHUFFLE MASTER INC X X X X
23 STATION CASINOS INC X
24 TRANSACT TECHNOLOGIES INC X X X X
25 W M S INDUSTRIES INC X X X X
26 WYNN RESORTS LTD X X X X
Total 25 firms 21 firms 18 firms 19 firms
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ceedings. We chose to estimate the parameters
of the model using 255 days of data ending
40 days prior to each informational event.
We did this to, as much as possible, avoid
confounding information about UIGEA that
could potentially bias the estimates. Once the
parameters ai and bi had been estimated for
each firm, the Abnormal Returns (daily
prediction errors) for firm i was calculated as
follows:
ARit ¼ Rit 2 ½ai þ BiRmt;
where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on
day t.
We examine abnormal returns for the day
before, day of and day after the informational
event. For Event 1 this approach implies a 4-day
event window because the first event includes
the attachment and vote in the House on the
29th and the attachment and vote in the Senate
on the 30th. We include these as a single event
because they happen in quick succession, and
both may add information to the market. For
Event 2, 3 and 4, we use the typical 3-day
window that includes the event day and the
two trading days immediately before and after
the event. Inclusion of the trading day prior to
the event controls for information leakage that
may occur if some market participants are privy
to discussions among policy makers prior to
public announcement of policy actions.
Inclusion of the trading day after the event
accounts for late arrival of information to the
market as well as time for market participants to
process the information. A window that is too
large will include extraneous information.
Conversely, a window that is too small will not
fully capture the effects of information leakage
or slow market adjustment. We chose a short
window of 4-days for Event 1 and a window of
3-days for Events 2, 3 and 4. Thus, our results
are conservative and might underestimate the
impact of UIGEA and the interpretative actions
associated with UIGEA.
The 4-day cumulative abnormal returns
for each firm for Event 1 were computed as
below:
þ2
CARi ¼
P
ARit
T ¼ 21;
where
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for
firm i.
ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day
t.
t ¼ 0 is the first day of Event 1, the House
action on the UIGEA conference report.
t ¼ 1 is the second day of Event 1, the
Senate action on the UIGEA conference
report.
Each firm’s CARi for Events 2, 3, and 4 were
computed by cumulating ARit over the 3-day
window, 21 to þ1, where 0 is the event date.
To determine the average overall impact of
Event 1 (Events 2, 3, and 4) on the industry, we
calculate the 4-day (3-day) cumulative average
abnormal return by summing across n firms in
the sample and dividing by the number of firms
in the sample that are available for the event:
n
CAAR ¼PCARi=n
i ¼ 1;
where
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal
return across all n firms in the Sample
CARi is the 4-day (3-day) cumulative return
for firm i around Event 1 (Events 2, 3, and 4)
To examine whether each informational event
had a significant average return effect on the
industry, a test of thenull hypothesis that the4-day
(Event 1) or 3-day (Events 2, 3, and 4) cumulative
average abnormal returns across firms equals zero
isperformedbycalculating a standardZ-statistic, a
Patel Z-Statistic, and a portfolio time series Crude
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 37
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:1
9 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Dependence Adjusted (CDA) test statistic.
We provide three statistics for the following
reasons. One, the standard Z-statistic is well
known to all researchers and thusmay be a useful
benchmark. Second, the Patel Z-Statistic is the
most commonly used statistic in the event study
literature and is familiar to most finance
professionals. Finally, the CDA is a contemporary
test statistic that adjusts for cross-sectional
dependence arising from the fact that each
firm’s events occur on the same days. Bloom
(2011) and Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)
argue that, under these circumstances, the CDA
test is the most appropriate and reliable test of
significance.
Cross-sectional Analysis
Cross-sectional analysis is employed to test
the second hypothesis that firms with a greater
percentage of their revenues from retail gaming
will be more impacted by the UIGEA.We chose
to run regressions only for the two significant
events. We did this because it is difficult to
interpret regression results for insignificant
events.
Weestimate the followingmultiple regression
model for all available observations in the sample:
Model ¼ CARi ¼ g0 þ g1PERCENTi;
where PERCENTi is the percentage of revenue
that the firm received directly from gaming
activities in the year ending closest to, but before
the event date; and g0 and g1 are the estimated
intercept and the slope coefficients, respectively.
Our hypothesis predicts that the estimated
coefficient on PERCENT, g1, will be significant
because BMS firms often have revenues from
other assets, such as hotels and restaurants, that
may not be as heavily impacted as assets that
are directly associated with gaming assets. The
results of the cross-sectional analysis are
discussed in “Results Cross-Sectional Analyses”
in the following section.
RESULTS
Results of Event Testing
Table 5 presents our test of hypotheses
H1A–H1D, which predicts that UIGEA has a
positive impact on BMS firms and that
TABLE 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) Over a 4-Day or 3-Day Event Window Around the Event.
Event Tested
Number of
Firms1
4-Day
CAAR2
3-Day
CAAR3 Pos/Neg4
Generalized
Z-Statistic5
(p-Value)
Patel Z-Statistic6
(p-Value)
Portfolio Time
Series CDA7
(p-Value)
Passage of UIGEA 25 2.86% 19/6 2.793 4.232 1.751
(0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0400)
Federal Reserve Board Rulemaking 21 20.98% 13/8 1.319 20.523 20.4413
(0.0935) (0.3005) (0.3296)
Black Friday 18 1.77% 15/3 3.026 1.957 1.071
(0.0012) (0.0252) (0.1420)
DOJ Flip- Flop 19 3.55% 14/5 2.308 3.490 2.415
(0.0105) (0.0002) (0.0079)
1 Number of the firms used in the event analysis.
2 4-Day CAAR is the average abnormal return for the 25 firms over the 4-day event window, which consists of the day before, 2 days of
the event and day after the event. Abnormal returns are calculated using an equal weighted market index.
3 3-Day CAAR is the average abnormal return for the 25 firms over the 3-day event window, day before the event day of the event and
day after the event. Abnormal returns are calculated using an equal weighted market index.
4 The number of firms experiencing a positive abnormal return relative to a negative abnormal return for the event.
5 The generalized Z-Statistic tests Hypothesis 3 that the 4-Day CAAR ¼ 0.
6 The Patel Z-Statistic tests Hypothesis 3 that the 4-Day CAAR ¼ 0. The Patel Z is the most commonly used test statistic in event studies.
It is a parametric, standardized Normal test, which assumes that excess return data are normally distributed and cross-sectionally
independent.
7 The CDA Statistic tests Hypothesis 3 that the 4-Day CAAR ¼ 0. CDA is the crude dependence adjustment portfolio time series test.
It is the most appropriate test for use in this study because all of the events happen to the firms at the same time. Therefore cross sectional
dependence is likely. (See Bloom 2011.)
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interpretative administrative rulings and DOJ
actions created a positive significant impact on
the equity values in the gaming industry.
The CAAR for the first event, the attach-
ment of UIGEA to the SAEPA, is 2.86% at a level
of significance of .04 for the CDA test. The CDA
test value generally agrees with the other two
test statistics provided. In other words, the
equity values of our sample firms equity
increased by an average of 2.86% in response
to the informational event that provided the
greatest indicator that UIGEA would become
law. Thus, we conclude that UIGEA as it was
passed in 2006 had a significant positive impact
on the publicly traded brick-and-mortar and
suppliers (BMS) in our sample. We further
conclude that the view presented by Philander
(2011) and the American Gaming Association is
correct. Specifically, in the early days of Internet
gaming, the BMS firms had not invested in the
Internet. The UIGEA effectively reduced
competition from a substitute good and
increased the wealth of the BMS firms. This
might help explain why the BMS firms did not
actively fight UIGEA in 2006.
The CAAR for Event 2, the final rulemaking,
is 2 .98% and is insignificant. Thus, the equity
values of BMS firms were not impacted by this
rulemaking announcement. It is likely that after
many public hearings over a two-and-a-half-
year time span, much of the specifics about the
rules that were to be announced had already
been impounded by the market.
The CAAR for Event 3, the DOJ indictment
of firms for illegal Internet gaming and money
laundering, is 1.77% at a level of significance of
.1420 for the CDA test value. We note that
the CDA test value for Black Friday differs
substantially from the Z- statistic ( p-
value ¼ .0012) and Patell-Z (p-value ¼ .0252)
tests. Because the CDA test controls for cross-
sectional dependence, we focus on it rather
than asserting an effect where none exists.
Black Friday might not have been significant.
The indictment had two potentially offsetting
effects on the BMS firms’ future revenues.
On one hand, the indictment destroyed several
online competitors to the BMS, but on the other
hand, it seemed to eliminate the any possibility
of brick-and-mortar firms being able to enter
the Internet market. Thus, we conclude that the
DOJ indictments did not impact the equity
values of BMS firms.
The CAAR for Event 4, the DOJ’s reversal of
its stance about what constitutes illegal gaming,
is 3.55% and is significant at the .0079 level for
the CDA test value. In other words, the DOJ
ruling that some forms of Internet gaming are
legal increases the value of BMS firms
significantly. This result might seem surprising
because the original adoption of UIGEA had
also been positive. But this paradox fits the
America Gaming Association’s view that the
industry had changed over the years since
adoption of UIGEA in 2006 (Stewart, 2011).
Early on, firms had not invested in Internet
gaming because they believed that such
activities were of questionable legality. How-
ever, investors were concerned that the firms
were losing a great deal of money to new,
online, gaming firms that were willing to bear
the risk of the activities’ questionable legality.
When the UIGEA came along, investors were
pleased because they thought competition
from the online firms would be substantially
reduced, and BMS firms would see revenue
increases over time. Later, the BMS firms and
their investors realized that a highly regulated
market might eliminate much of the compe-
tition from international firms, yet allow U.S.
BMS firms to experience revenue growth from
online gaming
Results of Cross-Sectional Analyses
Tables 6A and 6B present the results of our
cross-sectional regression of CARs on the
percentage of revenue from retail gaming for
significant Events 1 and 4, respectively. The
results of the cross-sectional analysis can be
interpreted in light of the evolution of the
gaming industry over the time of this study as
discussed in the introduction section of this
article. For Event 1, the percentage of revenues
variable is significant at the 1% level. This is
consistent with the idea that BMS firms gain
more if they are heavily exposed to cannibaliza-
tion of their revenues by Internet gaming firms
at a time when they had no presence in the
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Internet marketplace. For Event 4, the
percentage of revenues variable is insignificant
(p ¼ 0.56). This result is consistent with the
view that by 2011 BMS firms were poised to
enter the Internet market and capture some of
the revenues in a growth area. In this situation,
firms with a greater percentage of their
revenues from retail gaming are not necessarily
in a better position to compete in the Internet
marketplace.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
OnOctober 13, 2006, President Bush signed
theUnlawful InternetGambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA) of 2006 as an attachment to the Security
and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006.
This was the first action that provided federal
regulation specific to the online gambling
industry. In this article we examined the impact
of UIGEA and its subsequent interpretation
(through administrative rulemaking and Depart-
ment of Justice actions), on the value of U.S.
publicly traded firms in the gambling industry.
From this study we are able to draw three
conclusions. Thefirst andmost important result of
our study is that the UIGEA increased firm values
in the gambling industry by 2.86%, or more than
1.6 billion dollars.4 This result is statistically
significant,with ap-value of .04.One implication
is that BMS firm managers might not wish to
TABLE 6A. Regression of 4-day CARi
1 Around Event 1 on the Percent of Revenues the Firm Received from Retail Gambling.
Coefficient t-Statistic5 p-value
Intercept 20.00184 20.13961 0.890182
PERCENT 0.059927 2.851044 0.009041
R2 ¼ 0.2611263
Adjusted R2 ¼ 0.229001
Mean PERCENT for nonsupplier firms ¼ 70.56%
1 CARi is the 4-day cumulative abnormal return for firm around Event 1.
2 PERCENT is the percentage of revenues that the firm received from retail gambling, as reported in the annual report for year-end
2005. This information would have been available to all investors valuing the firms at the time of the event in 2006.
3 The R2 (i.e., the percent of variability in the CARs that is explained by the variability in PERCENT), is low. The low R2 may be due to
two factors. One, the study has a relatively small sample size making it more difficult to obtain high R2s. Two, due to the comingling of food,
beverage and hotel activities within the brick-and-mortar firms the reported percentage of revenues associated with gaming, PERCENT,
may not be precise. Hence, explanatory power may be limited.
TABLE 6B. Regression of 3-Day Cari
1 Around Event 4 on the Percent of Revenues the Firm Received from Retail Gambling.
Coefficient t-Statistic5 p-value
Intercept 0.02785 1.651856 0.116913
PERCENT 20.016228 0.662429 0.516577
R2 ¼ 0.251634
Adjusted R2 ¼ 0.03218
Mean PERCENT for nonsupplier firms ¼ 76.54%3
1 CARi is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return for firm around Event 2.
2 PERCENT is the percentage of revenues that the firm received from retail gambling as reported in the annual report for year-end
2010. This information would have been available to all investors valuing the firms at the time of the event in 2011.
3 The sample of firms consists of 2 groups, the retail Gambling firms and their suppliers. For the retail firms the average percentage of
their revenues that comes from gambling is 76.54%. For the supplier firms 0% of the revenues is from retail gambling. Therefore, this
equation implies that the retail gambling firms had an average CAR of 4.04% associated with event 1 and the supplier firms had a20.18%
(approximately 0%) CAR associated with Event 1.
4 The R2 (i.e., the percent of variability in the CARs that is explained by the variability in PERCENT), is low. The low R2 may be due to
two factors. One, the study has a relatively small sample size making it more difficult to obtain high R2s. Two, due to the comingling of food,
beverage and hotel activities within the brick-and-mortar firms the reported percentage of revenues associated with gaming, PERCENT,
may not be precise. Hence, explanatory power may be limited.
4Based on available end 2005, beginning 2006 market
values of firms as reported by COMPUSTAT.
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support limitless, unregulated, Internet gaming.
That is, regulation of the Internet is clearly good
for existingfirms.By itself this resultmight seem to
reinforce the view of Sheldon Adelson, dubbed
the Casino King, that Internet gaming should be
totally banned for the benefit of the gaming
industry and society (Kuznetz, 2014). Consistent
with this, a second result of our work is that
controlled online gaming is likely to benefit the
existing BMS firms more than an outright ban on
online gaming would. This conclusion comes
from our analysis of the Justice Department’s
December 23, 2011, ruling that not all of online
gambling is illegal. In response to this ruling,
market values of gaming firms rose by 3.55%, or
more than 2.4 billion dollars.5 This result is also
significant, with a p-value of .0079. This result
implies that most of the gaming industry should
not be opposed to the legalization of regulated
online gaming. Thus, our findings are consistent
with the long-held view of the American Gaming
Association that controlled online gaming is what
is best for the industry. Our third major result in
the study is that firmswith a greater percentage of
their revenue from retail gambling gained more
from UIGEA. Knowledge of the differential
impact of the regulation on various subsectors
of the gaming industry helps managers to devise
more targeted, and hence, more effective and
efficient corporate strategies.
From the analysis presented in this article,
we conclude that allowing regulated, con-
trolled, growth of Internet gambling is likely to
provide significant value to the U.S. gambling
industry. This positive effect is likely to occur
for several reasons. One, it will likely create
barriers to entry into the online market and
increase revenues for firms in the industry. Two,
it is likely to reduce the risk of BMS firms that
choose to enter the Internet gaming market by
creating rules and procedures that keep
underage and problem gamblers away from
online gaming. Finally, BMS may find positive
benefits in terms of marketing and sales that
occur when they are able to produce an online
product that is related to existing brick-and-
mortar activities.
Internet gaming activity worldwide can be
expected to continue to grow and change in the
future. It is unclear to most gaming compa-
nies—brick-and-mortar and Internet compa-
nies—what Internet gaming will be and won’t
be legal in the United States in the future. Thus,
U.S. regulation is a significant source of industry
risk. This risk, in turn, increases the riskiness
of investment decisions. Through time, if U.S.
legislation and government rulemaking more
clearly defines “legal gaming,” the benefits and
risks associated with investment in all areas of
the gaming industry will be altered. We suggest
that two areas of future research could yield a
greater understanding of Internet gaming
regulation and the relationship between
Internet gaming and value of BMS firms: (a) as
regulatory changes happen in the future, event
study methodology can be used to assess
changes in market expectations associated with
new rulemaking and legislation; (b) if the
definition of “legal” versus “illegal” Internet
gaming is clarified by U.S. regulators, it will be
useful to do an ex-post analysis of BMS firm
investment patterns and investment rates of
return. This will allow us to quantify the
actualized (versus expected) impact of Internet
gaming regulation on the industry.
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